Donald Nijboer is a freelance writer who lives in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Nijboer teaches courses in radio broadcasting at Humber College.

The title “Spitfire V vs C.202 Folgore: Malta 1942” is part of the Osprey Publishing “Osprey Duel” (Engage the Enemy) Series. The book attempts to evaluate the merits of the two WWII fighters, taking into consideration the machines, the men, training and the systems supporting the two aircraft.

The area of operations considered in this book Includes Sicily and Malta during the Battle of Malta in 1942.

The primary fighters and variants considered in this comparative analysis are the Supermarine Spitfire Vb/Vc Trop equipped with the Vokes filter and the Macchi C.202 (Serie VII).

Because of the large number of errors and inaccuracies in this book, the format below has been adopted with Conclusions provided at the end of the Review.

*Additional comments by Stefano Lazzaro.

Errors and Inaccuracies:
p.4 makes no mention that the Supermarine racers (and subsequently the Spitfire itself) were influenced by the Macchi M.39 [3].

p.5 - Nijboer compares the C.200 to the Hurricane by simply comparing the horsepower of the two planes, but fails to note that the two planes were almost the same speed in a straight line and that the C.200 was superior to the Hurricane I in every other aspect such as climb, dive speed and maneuverability and could even keep up with a Spitfire I in a climb C.200 (3,030 ft/min) vs Spitfire I (2,895 ft/min). Nijboer keeps repeating the C.200 was under-gunned but fails to mention that the 12.7mm guns could outrange the 0.303mm guns of the Hurricane. C.202 pilots showed later on in the war the C.202 was quiet capable of shooting down B.24s with just the two SAFATs (Ref. 53o Stormo, Marco Mattioli [1]). Amleto Monterumici (90a Sq.) pointed out that at least a couple of Hurricanes lost their wings following a steep dive of his 200. Macchi fighters were very sturdy.

p.6 - 2nd parag. - C.202 was superior to Hurricane I and P.40 but the C.202 was also superior to the P.38 - see 53o Stormo, Marco Mattioli [1]. Ace Luigi Gorrini wondered how in summer 1943 a P-38 escaped from his C.205V Serie III; he admitted that the enemy pilot was highly experienced, because there was no chance for a twin-engine fighter when opposed by a single-engined one, during a dogfight. Bf.110s in BoB teaches us this.

p.7 - C.202 caption with incorrect colors, mixes up the Serie Mimetica colors with the Tavola X colors. “Fresh from the factory floor, this C.202 (Serie III MM7806) is painted in the regulation scheme specified for operation in the ‘colonies’. The overall base colour was Giallo Mimetico [yellow], with Verde Mimetico [green] mottling, and Nocciola Chiaro [light chestnut] undersides.” No surprise. There’s a lot of confusion over Italian camouflage, even among Italians. Truly, early examples used old stocks of Mimetico serie, but it’s hard to believe that undersides were hazelnut.

p.16 - caption BR226 – “… the fighter is equipped with a full armament of four 20mm cannon and eight 0.303-in machine guns.” 4 x 20mm canons and 8 x 0.303 in MGs should be either 4 x 20mm canons or 8 x 0.303in MGs. There were other configurations possible with the Vc such as two 20mm canons and two 0.303in MGs which was actually the most common armament for Malta-based Spitfires.

p.17 - first paragraph, not sure if the author wrote this or the editor - “The Macchi C.202 has to be regarded as one of the finest fighters of WWII. Often forgotten and mentioned in only passing, Dr. Mario Castoldi’s aircraft garnered the highest respect from allied pilots – something wartime propaganda tried to play down. Initially viewed as forced marriage between a German engine and existing Italian airframe, the C.202 was not taken seriously. This sentiment quickly vanished when Hurricane and Kittyhawk pilots found themselves fighting for their lives against the fast and nimble C.202.” Despite propaganda which drew Italian pilots as unable and prone to aerobatics, by reading private diaries we realized that Allied pilots had great respect for RA pilots, and considered them very dangerous as enemies. We’ve seen this during researches for our book on AOI. See also Anthony Dawson’s The Luck of the Devil. In Vivian Voss’ The Story of 1 SAAF (1952) there is the following anecdote: [In East Africa] When new pilots arrived they were given useful tips by the operationally experienced Officers. One of the first things they were taught was to develop the “rubber neck”. It was highly necessary for pilots regularly to twist their heads as far as possible round to the right, and then round to the left, while weaving slightly, so as to be able to see the entire sky behind them. Failing this they were certain, sooner or later, to be jumped. Silk scarves used to be worn to minimise the chafing of their necks. When Lt. J. Van der Merwe first joined the Squadron he could not believe that the rubber neck was really necessary. It was not long before two CR.42s, coming down on his tail like arrows from heaven, cured him once and for all of his casual views on keeping a watch for [enemy] fighters. He was one of the lucky ones to survive such an attack.

p.17 - bottom page – “the Fiat G.50 and Macchi C.200 monoplane fighters were virtually obsolete by the time they entered service in 1938 and 1939, respectively.” the C.200 was essentially the same speed as a Hurricane in a straight line and could out turn, out climb and out dive it and combat records show that the C.200 was superior to the Hurricane, the Allied fighter it mostly encountered early on in the war. See above. Note that the G.50 was considered a “winged iron” by our own pilots. C.200 was indeed better and at least equal to Hurricane. Their A.74 engine was not the top, but it was enough reliable.

p.18 - 2nd parag. - "all three (C.200, G.50 and Re.2000) were considerably underpowered compared to their liquid-cooled inline-engine contemporaries such as the Hurricane I" ... fails to point out that the C.200 was as fast as the Hurricane I, the Re.2000 was also faster than a Hurricane, and that both the Piaggio P XI RC40 and the Fiat A74 RC38 were compact engines, lighter and less complex than inline engines leading to more efficient designs, were quiet reliable in sand and dry climates and also the US pursued a similar line of development (i.e., radial engine fighters). The Italians did have more powerful radials such as the Piaggio P.XI RC40 that generated 1,000 hp but chose the smaller more compact engine since performance was not much impacted by these engines. Inline engines did boost performance on designs such as the Spitfire but the C.200, G.50 and Re.2000 would only face Gladiators and Hurricanes I early in the war and both the C.200 and Re.2000 outclassed both these planes – the planes were good enough during the period the planes were used. Notwithstanding the racers, Italy failed to get a powerful engine for the war, and their best fighters were equipped with the German DB 601/605. Being more accurate in building than Messerschmitt (but also more expensive) they outperformed in manoeuvrability also the 109s. The initial choice of a radial instead of an in-line engine was partly because the latter, water-cooled item was considered more vulnerable in combat, but sadly we had not radial engines like BMW 801 or P&W.

p.18 - 2nd parag. – “In an effort to address this problem” of underpowered aircraft "Il Duce" forced the resignation of the Chief of the Air Staff Giuseppe Valle in 1939", however the resignation had little to do with the performance of planes but the readiness of the Regia Aeronautica for war, Giuseppe Valle opposed war and was thus replaced with Francesco Pricolo. General opinion among generals at the time was that Italy, which expended a lot of resources in Ethiopian and Spanish wars, could not be ready for a new, large war before 1942. Recent theories say that Italy was also compelled to join Germany by the shortcoming of coal made by UK, which was aiming at the control of the Mediterranean. Coal was then the main energy source. See for comparison what’s happening in Europe with the Russian gas nowadays. The early fast successes of Germany and the perspective of an easy final victory was the last factor that pushed Mussolini to enter the war. It did it badly unprepared for this.

p.18 - 3nd parag. bottom - "Armed with just two Breda-SAFAT 12.7mm MGs, the C.200 was at an extreme disadvantage when up against Allied fighters that boasted at least six (often eight) 0.303-in MGs" while neglecting to mention that the 12.7mm (0.5in) calibre round had greater hitting and destructive power than the 0.303 Browning MGs, and that C.202s were shooting down B-24s later on in the war while the 6-8 Brownings themselves would be supplanted by canons (in part Vb, Vc), if 6-8 small guns were an advantage, why replace them? The 12.7mm round had a greater effective range than the smaller calibre 0.303in round, indeed the Germans never adopted such an armament arrangement or any other nation except the US, and that German armament on the Bf.109 was closer to the Italians and perhaps also the simple matter that the Italian pilots didn't need that many guns; kill/sortie ratios show Italian pilots were as effective as their Allied counter parts.

p.19 - 2nd parag. end - "The C.202 required 20,000 man-hours to produce compared to just 4,500 Bf.109" –Nijboer doesn’t make a comparison to the number of hours needed to manufacture a Spitfire (some estimates give 13,000 hrs; early-Spitfires 20,000 hrs[6]) – after all, isn’t this book about a comparison of the C.202 vs Spitfire V (not a Bf.109); nevertheless Italian pilots did in fact comment on the crudeness of the Bf.109 (ref. 53o Stormo, M. Mattioli [1]), compared to the C.202 i.e., the C.202 was better built. Nijboer infers that the C.202 was difficult or too complicated to manufacture even though the amount of hours to manufacture the C.202 and Spitfire were closer to each other than to a Bf.109 (if not the same according to Vergnano and Alego[6]). By Nijboer's own definition, if the C.202 was too complicated to produce, then shouldn't he have said the same thing about the Spitfire, that it too, was too complicated to manufacture since it took almost (or at least) 3 times the number of hours to manufacture compared to a Bf.109? So are we left with two overly complicated designs in the Spitfire and C.202 or are we left with two planes that were arguably better than the Bf.109? The McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle took much longer to manufacture than a Mig 21, Mig 23, Mig 25 or even a Mig 29, however rarely in the West is this a factor held against it. True. No need to compare two Axis fighters in this contest. Germans needed a fast-building and cheap fighter for their Blitzkrieg. Fighting tactics were adapted to this. Working hours and cost of Macchi was almost triple than Messrs, but sturdiness and survival capability in crashlanding was much superior. In a vertical dive a Macchi had no rivals, at least until the arrival of the Mustangs. They approached almost to Mach 1 and experimented compressibility phenomena.

p.19 – 1st parag. - Curiously the author invokes the Power-to-weight-ratio or (PWR, also called specific power, or power-to-mass ratio) to describe the “destructive power” of the 12.5mm (0.5 in) Breda-SAFAT mgs, however I have never seen such a metric used to describe the destructive power of a machine gun. The PWR is typically used to describe the mobility of armored vehicles/tanks. The author also displays a drawing of the Breda-machine gun installations but doesn’t reference it anywhere in the text or its purpose. The author also references the gun’s rpm, that the two guns were limited in rpm 380 – 750 rpm, focusing on the lower end of the range without pointing out that the maximum rpm would be reached almost always in combat since most fighters operated their planes at full-throttle and fails to mention that Italian pilot complaints were not raised about the need for cannons (not more machine guns) until only when American four engine heavy bombers arrived and even then the C.202 was still capable of shooting down B-24s (ref. 53o Stormo, M. Mattioli [1]). I think it might have been more helpful to readers if the author had mentioned that the Italians did in fact up-gun the C.202 with two wing-mounted 7.7mm mgs, the same calibre as those on the Spitfire, however the 7.7mm (0.303in) mgs were not used or removed because of their lack hitting power. Perhaps Allied pilots would have done better early on if they had adopted heavier calibre machine guns instead of the 0.303in guns. On a positive Nijboer points out that the Breda-SAFATs 12.5mm (0.5in) was reliable and accurate although he could have added that these guns had a longer effective trajectory than the 0.303in Browning guns and that the Italian round was heavier and thus had greater hitting/destructive power (momentum). Nijboer should also point out when comparing the armament of the two planes, that because of the unreliability of 20mm Hispano-Suiza guns (purportedly because of poor ammunition) the Vc gun arrangement (the universal wing) with double 20mm canons was not often used and instead only 2 x 20mm canons were carried with 2 x 0.303 Browning MGs. The 2 x 20mm guns were limited initially to 60 rds which meant that the Spitfires were sometimes down to just two 0.303in (7.7mm) guns in combat! C.202 pilots were hardly at a disadvantage in these cases. Italian pilots were very satisfied with the SAFAT 12.7, because of their reliability and straight fire. Low rate wasn’t a problem, usually a few precise rounds were enough to shot down a fighter. HEI bullets were very effective and much feared by adversaries. Even Americans relied on .50s, until at least Korea, but in greater number than just two. Tactics were adapted by Italians according to the equipment. In AOI, FIATs had just one 12.7 and one 7.7; and until at least July 1940 they had only ordinary bullets (i.e. lead core) but solved the problem to shoot down Wellesleys and Blenheims simply killing the pilot! Over Italy they did the same: they aimed at the cockpit. Cruel indeed, but it was the war. On the other side, there is no news of Italian shooting at parachuted crew, a hateful practice sometimes performed by the Allies.

p.19 – 2nd parag. – in this paragraph the author finally mentions the two additional C.202 7.7mm wing mounted guns but goes onto argue that the guns were ineffective because of their calibre, and I agree (and so did the Italians), and in doing so precisely argues against the effectiveness of the 0.303in Browning guns, which by the way, were exactly the same calibre as the Italian wing guns, while adding further that the all up weight of the C.202 now increased because of the two wing additional guns putting the C.202 at a “distinct disadvantage”. Nijboer neglects to mention that Italian pilots usually had the two wing guns removed. Curiously the author always references the Italians wing guns as 7.7mm and the British guns as 0.303in – both were in fact the same calibre. It’s possible the author doesn’t realize the two gun calibres were the same, and thus implicitly argues against the use and effectiveness of these kinds of guns in the Spitfire or any other Allied fighter, which he argues in favor of! It is a contradiction that can only be explained in that Nijboer isn’t aware the two gun calibres are the same. Not only the same calibre, but 7.7 rounds were the Browning produced under license. When captured, Italians used the .303 without problems in their SAFAT. I’ve never seen an active 202 with wing guns. They were standard just in the more powerful Serie I 205s, or in Reggiane 2000-2001-2002s.

p.20 – 3rd parag. – “A moulded armor-plate seat was fitted (it was somewhat lighter than comparable Allied seats)” I’m not sure what point the author is making here, but there were no complaints about the adequacy of Italian seat armor and even though it may have been lighter somewhat it was effective against the light calibre guns used on the Spitfire. And the author fails to mention the composition of the seat metal which is perhaps a better way to argue the effectiveness of armor e.g., tensile strength, steel, aluminum, iron etc. I’ve seen an armoured seat of a Veltro (the same as 202) and I can say it’s made of steel. Very heavy in weight.

p.20 – 3rd parag. – “… but no armored windscreen was included (C.202)”, starting from Serie VII the C.202 was equipped with an armored windscreen, previous Serie had an armored-seat and self-sealing tanks. Many Serie VII planes with armored-windscreens operated over Malta, here are a few examples:

1) C.202 Serie VII MM.9042, 1-151, flown by Furio Niclot Doglio, 151a Sq., 20o Gr., 51o Stormo Gela, 27 July 1942
2) C.202 Serie VII MM.9066, 2-151, flown by Ennio Tarantola, 151a Sq., 20o Gr., 51o Stormo Gela, Sept. 1942
3) C.202 Serie VII MM.9065, flown by Duilio Fanali, 155o Gr., 51o Stormo Gela, Oct. 1942

It should be mentioned that since the C.202 was used primarily in escort and air-superiority roles over Malta, the armored windscreen wasn’t really necessary until later in the war when US heavy bombers appeared over Italy. True. Also, self-sealing tanks were provided since early series, or at least changed during overhauling.

p.20 – 4th parag. – “C.202 … achieved speeds of 372 mph at 16,405 ft … and reached 16,405 ft in 4 min 40 sec. All this was accomplished with an engine that had 340 less horsepower than the Merlin 45/46” – yes, I agree with Nijboer.

p.21 + p.22 drawing with caption of Furio Niclot Doglio’s machine MM.9042 – missing the armored windscreen in the drawing, command pennant on fuselage sides missing thin blue border. Colors are NC4 + VOS2 smoke rings with GAC1 undersurfaces.

p.22 – 1st parag. – “… the Reggiane Re.2001 Ariete I (Ram)” is incorrect … the nick-name of the Reggiane Re.2001 was Falco II, aircraft nick-names were rarely used by Italian pilots. The nick-name of the Re.2002 was Ariete (Ram), a quick Google search would have corrected this error. Although it may seem unimportant, the mistaking of nicknames is equivalent to mixing up the designations of the Spitfire V and Spitfire IX or referring to a Spitfire as a Hurricane or vice versa.

p.22 – 2nd parag. – “In fact relatively few modifications were made to the C.202 during its production.” A testament to its original design that the plane remained competitive up to 1943, and up to the end of the war in the C.205V.

p.24 – 1st parag. – “… before the Macchi factory was destroyed by Allied heavy bombers in May 1944.” The Macchi works at Varese were bombed on April 1, 1944 and FIAT Aeronautica on April 25, 1944.

p.24 – 3rd parag. – “Re.2005 Sagittario … Armament consisted of … two BREDA-SAFAT 12.7mm machine guns in the wings”. The wing mounted guns on the Re.2005 were 20mm canons. 3 x 20mm canons in all (one firing through the propeller hub + 2 in the wings) + two 12.7mm MGs in the engine cowling. Just the two prototypes had 12.7s in the wings, the other two 20mm Mauser.

p.24 – 3rd parag. – “Re.2005 Sagittario … top speed of 390 mph”. The top speed of the Re.2005 was 421 mph (678 km/h) at 22,800 ft (6,949 m).

p.24 – 4th parag. – “Italy’s poor industrial base led directly to the C.202s failure in combat”? I disagree. In combat the 202 was equal, or sometimes superior to the adversaries. If some shortcoming was, is to be found in poor number and poor training later in the war. This was true also for Germans. In Sicily, pilots afforded a five-to-tenfold numbers of enemy fighters. If numbers were inverted, should he say the same for Allies?

p.32 – Serie V – “A more modern San Giorgio C reflector gunsight was also fitted. (C.202)” The San Giorgio Tipo C was fitted to the Series 5 fighters (e.g., C.205V Serie I, G.55, Reggiane Re.2005); the San Giorgio Tipo B (also a reflector gunsight) was standard equipment on the C.202.

p.32 – Serie VII – finally mentions the armored windscreen but doesn’t call it that instead Nijboer refers to it as a “central armored glass panel” while spending sometime explaining why the 7.7mm guns wing guns “did little to increase overall firepower” (again, repeats this line of argument throughout the book), although the two wing guns with the same calibre were fitted to the Spitfire Vc, was seemingly not a drawback for the Spitfire? Contradicts himself.

p.33 – Serie XII – “These aircraft … were assembled under German control at the Breda factory between May – August 1943.” Nijboer seems unaware that the Italian Armistice occurred on September 8, 1943 and that the Germans did not seize Italian industry until after that date. Throughout the book, frequent errors like this make it appear that Nijboer is not at all knowledgeable about the Italian participation in WWII? Where is the editing in this book?

p.34 – Enemy Aircraft Report No.48/1 “(C.202) The pilot is well protected by armour plate from astern and, in fact to about 40 degrees off dead astern. He is provided with a bucket seat entirely constructed from a single piece of 8 mm armour which stretches from his shoulders almost to his knees and comes well around the sides of his body.” I can’t recall how thick was the armour but I believe it was thicker than 8 mm (maybe 15 mm?), however it was considered sufficient to stop 0.303 rounds and maybe American 0.50s.

p.37 - Map – missing the airbase at Pantelleria. Nijboer either is unaware or ignores this aspect of the battle where sorties were flown against Malta from Pantelleria, or at least he makes no mention of it – Nijboer only considers the Axis air bases in Sicily.

P.38 – 1st parag. – “British air defenses at the time consisted of just four Fleet Air Arm Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters. It was a token force, and one the Regia Aeronautica should have easily destroyed.” That is if the planes joined battle. All RA types scored over Malta when battle was joined. The Fiat CR.42 and C.200 had success over the Gladiator in the skies over Greece, in North Africa and East Africa.

P.38 – 1st parag. – “the Regia Aeronautica … was a second rate force, both technically and numerically.”? General opinion of Anglosaxon side. It is partially true, due to the late of preparation after two consecutive wars and lack of primary material (metals, coal, oil, etc.). Easy to speak if USA supports you with all you need.

P.38 – 1st parag. – “To help save the Italian army from complete collapse Hitler ordered Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel to North Africa” But the RE stopped the English advance in January 1941 at El Agheila. The British could not pursue further. Isn't this book supposed to be about the Spitfire vs C.202 over Malta, how did we get to Operation Compass?

p.40 – 2nd parag. – “Rommel could no longer tolerate this situation, and in the autumn of 1941 he pressed for additional air power to neutralize Malta once and for all.” And when given the choice to continue with his invasion of Egypt or eliminate Malta as a threat, Rommel chose to first postpone and then cancel Operation C3 / Herkules, the planned invasion of Malta in July 1942.

p.41 – 4th parag. – paints a negative picture of the Italian contribution in the SCW? The Italians basically won that war for Franco. The Fiat CR.32 would become a legendary aircraft with a kill ratio of 10:1. See above. He should try to count air kills. Also Aviazione Legionaria was left behind. This was not cost-free for the following War. Instead, it’s true the wrong evaluation about the capability of biplane vs monoplane fighters. An error which was shared with Ernst Udet who criticized Willi Messerschmitt on his new fighter: the 109!

p.42 – 1st + 2nd parag. – A lesson drawn from the SCW was that maneuverability would be an important part of air combat, Nijboer however believes that such a conclusion worked against the Italians in WWII, “While many fighter units included a selection of combat veterans at the beginning of the war, they were handicapped by their belief that better maneuverability would be decisive in aerial combat.” Maneuverability to this day is considered an important aspect of aerial combat. Moreover Nijboer contradicts himself further down on p.45 where he acknowledges that indeed “... the fighter’s ability to manoeuvre aggressively” is “... the key to success in aerial combat.”

p.42 – 2nd parag. – “The vertical dive-and-zoom and cut-and run tactics developed by the Luftwaffe in Spain were completely ignored (by the Regia Aeronautica). Unable to appreciate the changes that were taking place both technically and in the area of pilot training, the Regia Aeronautica would enter the war at a distinct disadvantage.” Firstly, the Regia Aeronautica wasn’t fighting the Luftwaffe and secondly the kill/sortie of RA pilots was the same as Allied pilots, so Italian pilots weren’t really disadvantaged and if you believe Nijboer’s claim that Italian equipment was inferior to Allied equipment, its training certainly couldn’t have made the problem worse. Thirdly Italian pilots were trained to avoid dogfighting with biplanes and were trained to use their superior speed and rate of climb (e.g., C.200) to dive on slower but more agile aircraft such as the Gladiator. The RA used essentially the same tactics that every air force used to deal with slower but more agile opponents. This is the central matter about this book: if you compare 202s and Mk.V you should remain in the contest. It’s useless to stress the undoubted faults of RA in organization and industrial power.

p.44 – 2nd parag. – BCATP – uses this acronym with no definition?

p.45 – 1st parag. – “… (RAF Training) as had been the case over the Western Front in 1918, agility and the fighter’s ability to manoeuvre aggressively were soon revealed to again be the keys to success in aerial combat in World War II.” This contradicts what Nijboer says on p.42 “The vertical dive-and-zoom and cut-and run tactics developed by the Luftwaffe in Spain were completely ignored (by the Regia Aeronautica). Unable to appreciate the changes that were taking place both technically and in the area of pilot training, the Regia Aeronautica would enter the war at a distinct disadvantage.” Nijboer criticizes the RA for using similar tactics as the RAF, even though the RA used both dog-fighting and dive-and-zoom. Touché! Italians soon learned to modify tactics according to war environment and the machines they had. In AOI they soon realized that a Gladiator was harder to outmanoeuvre, but the 42 had a super-charged engine which allowed it to reach a higher  ceiling, and a superior dive speed. So they began to fly high and jump them from above. Like a Falco... It was just on Fall 1940.

p.47 - Gunnery Training - "Unfortunately for Italian fighter pilots gunnery training was considered unimportant, and many would learn how to use their weapons in combat!" Not wholly true. Manuals for fighter pilots stressed gunnery training and fighter cameras were provided. If active training wasn’t always performed was because of economical reasons at the beginning of the war (don’t forget that Aviazione Legionaria won almost by itself the Spanish Air War), and for the need to press pilots into the fight later. But this was true also for Germany and most of all for Russia, for instance.

Nijboer repeats over and over in the book, especially early on, gun comparisons and seems to be unaware that the C.202 7.7mm wing guns were the same caliber as the 0.303 Brownings, arguing against their effectives in the C.202 but highlighting the guns in the Spitfire and even invoking PWR (Power to weight ratio)? Though synchronized, the .50 were in good advantage against the .303, either for range and for having explosive bullets. They were effective enough against fighters, less against bombers. Nevertheless, a comparison with the types should mention that Spitfire V had 20mm guns.

p.48 - last parag. – “In comparison, Italian pilots had a more leisurely routine in which one or two missions a day was the norm.” Italian pilots had to fly over many miles of open sea and if shot down had little prospect of survival or faced certain capture. However, Nijboer is contradicted on p.51 by Serg. Bruno Lentini “fighter pilots were in constant demand to fly escort missions and convoy protection literally round the clock.” It doesn’t sound like Italian pilots had a “leisurely routine”. No indeed. They reached up to 5 and over missions per day (and night) when invaded in AOI and Sicily.

pp.49-58 - Combat - Relatively thin, missing day-to-day operations, focuses mainly on the RAF side of the battle. Mostly challenges Italian claims even though Italian claims were generally more accurate than the RAF in WWII. A few engagements discussed, all more or less when RAF Spitfires prevailed – 53o Stormo, M. Mattioli [1] is a better reference.

pp.52-53 – side by side comparison of cockpits – British personnel who inspected the C.202 are often quoted as saying the C.202 was sparse, thus implying instrumentation was lacking compared to the Spitfire however, this is incorrect, the C.202 had everything needed to perform combat missions. The total number of instruments in a Spitfire (70) and C.202 (57) were similar although the Spitfire had more. The Spitfire cockpit in comparison could be viewed as being overly complex, having items such as a two position door catch, camera push button on a regular fighter, camera indicator supply plug, radio control plug storage, map case etc. When you remove these items the two planes’ cockpits were the same. If anything the Spitfire was over engineered which presented problems with additional maintenance and equipment that could malfunction if damaged in combat. Curiously the Spitfire lacked the two most basic devices, a clock and a compass, needed for example to rendezvous with other groups of aircraft or units in complex operations. It’s unclear what Nijboer means when he says (RA pilots/planes) were “Unable to operate in inclement weather” whether Nijboer is pointing to a specific blind flying instrument panel that was present on the Spitfire (or so-called), the C.202 was not used as a night fighter (there were night fighters in the Regia Aeronautica specifically equipped for night fighting that included lamps and the equipment used to power those devices). Few missions were flown in inclement weather but it should be said, neither did the Allies operate in these conditions. The Blind Flying instrument panel on the Spitfire had nothing that could not be found on a C.202, and if necessary the C.202 could be used in different (adverse) conditions. Referring to Italian pilots as “fair weather” fliers is unfair and inaccurate. It should be remembered that Italians were leaders in trans-oceanic flights that included the historic (and often dangerous) S.55 flights to South and North America. When Nijboer places such terms in quotation marks, he must cite the reference of which there are none in this book (this book has no Bibliography). If anything the C.202 had more useful gauges such as the ones mentioned above but also a vertical speed indicator, gun ammunition counters, emergency hydraulic pump and a pitot tube heater switch.

p.61 – 2nd parag. – “Any sort of aerial victory (for RA pilots) would have been either a lucky shot or accomplished at extremely close range.” A remarkable sentence.

p.61 – last parag. – argues that RA pilots had it easier than RAF pilots.

p.62 - 2nd parag. – concentrates on the stresses and strains associated with combat from a RAF perspective only “Alcohol was available (for RAF pilots on Malta), but it was difficult to obtain and of questionable quality and female companionship was highly unlikely.” A remarkable paragraph and sentence.

p.62 – 3rd parag. – “In stark contrast, the C.202 pilots of the Regia Aeronautica lived in a world of luxury on Sicily … their bases were a safe haven in which to relax and unwind. Italian fighter airfields were well stocked with good food and Italian wine. After a combat mission an Italian pilot could look forward to a hot meal and a shower, a good night’s rest and, in some cases female companionship.” This sounds like a phrase from someone who lost a battle than from someone who won it - excuses? Shows a lack of knowledge and an almost comical, ridiculous manner of reasoning. A remarkable paragraph.

p.67 – 2nd parag. – “Just two C.202 pilots become aces (shooting down Spitfires only – according to tables on p.72 and p.74) over Malta during 1942!” However only one RAF pilot became an ace (shooting down C.202s) during the same period? It was a question of how many Spitfires were in the air and if and when battle was joined and how many C.202s were committed to the battle. Nijboer needs to be clearer on he arrives at his conclusions or what conclusions he is referring to. There were many Italian aces that scored over Malta (see the list below), if fewer Italian pilots scored at least 5 kills over Malta it’s because they weren’t there long enough to do so, they spent most of their time in North Africa.

Also note RAF pilot claims were calculated differently than the RA:

“The Allies calculated the scores of its pilots and aces differently. For example, both the RAF and the USAAF combined the individual and shared victories in the total number of victories. In the case of the USAAF, shared victories were added to a pilots final score as 1/2, 1/3, or 1/4. A fraction represented a shared victory. For instance if three pilots claimed to have shot at an aircraft which was eventually shot down, the three pilots were each awarded a 1/3 victory. It is not uncommon to see the scores of USAAF (and RAF) pilots with fractional results e.g., 25.83 Maj GE Preddy.” V. Biondi [2]

p.70 – 1st parag. – “For Spitfire pilots, their scores are much higher” The scores of Spitfire pilots included bombers (and destroyed aircraft on the ground), C.202 pilots mainly battled fighters and their totals were calculated differently.

p.71 – 2nd parag. – “Italian claims on occasion were extremely excessive” this is unfair and inaccurate, RA pilot claims in general were more accurate than the RAF, there are many examples of this in 53o Stormo M. Mattioli [1]. There is a predilection with Nijboer to focus on aspects of the battle that put the RA in a poor light.

p.71 – 2nd parag. – “For the fighter pilots of the Regia Aeronautica, they would pay a particularly high price” 102 Spitfire pilots killed in the battles over Malta while the RA lost “60 C.202s and Re.2001s and 39 pilots killed”?

p.71 – last parag. – “Mario Castoldi’s C.202 was a great fighter. Fortunately for the allies it was never part of a effective fighter force.” Grammar error “a” should be “an” (Editing?). Nijboer just hasn’t shown enough knowledge about the RA to make this claim, he repeats what has been in print for many decades although he doesn’t cite any references in this book – there is no Bibliography.

p.72 – provides a table of 22 RAF pilots that scored against the C.202 over Malta. Compared to p.74, a similar list for RA pilots that scored against the Spitfire – there are only 2 pilots listed here – this is inaccurate. The list on p.74 should at least look like (to name a few aces not including those that were not aces but scored):

Fuio Doglio Nicolot
Ennio Tarantola
Teresio Martinoli
Franco Lucchini
Duilio Fanali
Feruccio Serafini
Jacopo Frigerio
Carlo Miani
Adriano Visconti

All these pilots shot down Spitfires over Malta in 1942 while flying the C.202. This list does not include Italian pilots who shot down Spitfires over Malta but were not aces.

p.72 – first row in table, lists George Beurling as an RAF pilot. George Beurling was a Canadian who enlisted with the RAF (he was refused by the RCAF because of his academic qualifications). After being accepted into the RAF he was subsequently posted to RCAF 403 Sq. Dec. 1941 and later officially transferred to the RCAF in 1943. In the table George Beurling really should be denoted as a RCAF pilot, as Henry McLeod RCAF just below Beurling’s entry and similarly to John Yarra an Australian who served with the RAF and is listed as an RAAF pilot in the table, as well as James Ballantyne RCAF and Lawrence Verrall RNZAF No.249 the same squadron as Beurling and John McElroy RCAF also with No.249. George Beurling considered himself a Canadian returning to Canada mid-war to support the War-bond drive. I can see why Beurling could be treated as an RAF pilot but at the least his designation should be RAF/RCAF since he was not British, and his father being Swedish and his mother Canadian.

p.74 - “Over the years extensive research done by authors … Christopher Shores ... has resulted in what is considered to be the most accurate listing of Italian aces of World War II.”?

p.74 – photo of 360-5, person next to plane is not P. Bartolucci.

p.75 – 1st parag. – “Many times during the siege Axis air forces were able to gain a clear air superiority over the island, but they never exploited their advantage through a full-scale invasion or complete blockade.” That’s because Rommel chose to first postpone Operation C3 / Herkules, the planned invasion of Malta in July 1942 and then finally cancelled the invasion in November 1942 to support his invasion of Egypt (Operation Aida).

p.75 – 3rd parag. – “367 Spitfires flown in … in stark contrast to the Regia Aeronautica’s inability to field more than 60 to 100 C.202s” there were never more than 100 Spitfires available to the RAF on Malta at any one time during the Battle of Malta in 1942, 367 Spitfires were flown-in over a period of many months. The C.202 wasn’t the only protagonist in the Battle of Malta, there were also CR.42, C.200, Re.2000, Re.2001, Re.2002 and experimental aircraft as well as German aircraft that amounted to many more planes in Sicily. The C.202 was also more urgently needed in North Africa.

p.76 – 3rd parag. – “Italy being the only nation during WWII to have separate air forces fighting for each side” I’m not sure what Nijboer is driving at, however the reason there were two Italian air forces in Italy after the Italian Armistice was because Italy was a combat zone until the very end of the war on May 2, 1945 and because the fascists (the Fascist Government of Mussolini, RSI), who many Italians still considered the legitimate government of Italy, refused to surrender. The Battle of Malta was long over when the ANR and Aeronautica Cobelligerante were formed, what does this have to do with the Spitfire V and C.202 in the Battle of Malta?

p.77 – 1st parag. – Italian pilots in North Italy after the Armistice “ ... they had no option but to fly. The alternative was to face deportation to a German labour camp.” Over 500,000 Italians in North Italy fought for the RSI armed forces after the armistice to the end of WWII.

p.77 last parag. – “(C.202) Renowned for its finger-light handling, it was superior to the Hurricane, Tomahawk and Kittyhawk and equal or better than the Spitfire V. While the C.202 may have had excellent performance, its combat capability never matched that of the Spitfire V, however.” The first sentence is correct, the second sentence appears to have been added later by an Editor or doesn’t follow from the first or he doesn't make the case clear enough. See 53o Stormo by M. Mattioli [1] to assess the combat effectiveness of the C.202 vs Spitfire. Nijboer seems to have come full circle here.

p.78-79 - The book has no bibliography, in fact the book has no citations despite presenting nothing new. The book contains a short list of Books for Further Reading on p.78 and two Spitfire Websites listed on p.79. Under Further Reading on p.78 Nijboer provides an un-numbered list of 22 books, all are English sources except three, two are Italian, the first is a pictorial history by Giorgio Apostolo, Wings of Italy, GAE Italy 1993 and the second by Giovanni Massimello and Giorgio Apostolo, Italian Aces, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2000. The third is a Polish publication of the C.202. All sources listed here are in English. Presumably this list is the extent of the references used by Nijboer to write this book.

Osprey were better off using two authors for this project, the second author might have been an expert on the C.202 or Macchi WWII fighters, or Italian Aviation during this period, and preferably an Italian Historian. Nijboer relies too heavily on the views that have been put into print for a long time without having a deep knowledge of the C.202 or its operational history nor a sufficient knowledge of its predecessor the C.200.

I think Nijboer’s primary interest is the Spitfire and because of this he makes allot of mistakes throughout the book, specifically in regard to the C.202.

Curiously Nijboer makes no mention of the comparative wing loadings which argue in favor of the Spitfire 27.9 lb/ft2 (137 kg/m2) vs Macchi C.202 35.7 lb/sq ft (174.2 kg/m2), although this seemed to have made little difference in combat since the Macchi C.202 (and even the C.200) were known to out climb the Spitfire V 3,250 ft/min (16.5 m/s) vs the C.202 3,560 ft/min (18.1 m/s) despite the C.202 having approximately 300 hp less than the Spitfire. This is explained in part by the greater efficiency of the C.202 wing.

The amount of errors in this book, specifically in regard to the C.202, calls into question the editing of this book, surely someone at Osprey Publishing could have spotted at least some of the errors?

This book might have some value to a Spitfire enthusiast but from an Italian WWII aviation enthusiast’s perspective this book holds little value. Indeed nothing new is presented here.

On balance Nijboer concludes the two planes were equal but from an objective point of view the C.202 was really the better plane, in virtually every performance category which he at least concedes to, but also in "combat capability" or at least Nijboer fails to make a clear enough case why he believes the Spitfire Vb/Vc Trop was a better combat platform. Even when armament is considered, and taking into account the unreliability of the Hispano-Suiza 20mm canons and the small calibre 0.303in Browning MGs, and even in cases where the Spitfire Vc might have been rendered to just two 0.303in wing guns, the Spitfire simply was not better than the C.202, in any case. This is not to denigrate the Spitfire or the men who flew it but to highlight the training and tactics of the Allies and that the Malta defenders enjoyed the advantage of defense on a faraway island fortress and an Axis top command that had priorities elsewhere.

The C.202 had some 300 hp less than the Spitfire V, but was still faster, could climb and dive quicker and was basically as maneuverable. Another comparison, perhaps more pertinent, might have been the C.202 vs Spitfire II or the C.205V vs Spitfire V, taking into account the approximate engine horsepower of the two planes, rather than when the planes appeared or the speed of the aircraft, and even at that, the author sometimes uses the speed of the Spitfire V instead of the speed of the Spitfire Vc Trop, that the C.202 mostly encountered over Malta. In any case, the C.202 was faster than both.

At times the book is unfocused and seems to veer away from the subject being discussed, Nijboer often contradicts himself or even seems confused e.g., while discussing armament and tactics. Nijboer seems not really interested in the RA or the C.202 or Italian equipment and armament in WWII.

This is one of those books I labored through, mainly because of the enormous amount of errors in it. The general impression I get is that Nijboer doesn’t know enough about the C.202 (or Italian aircraft in general), logistics, support and training to do an in-depth comparative analysis of the two planes and really doesn’t know enough about its operational history either to come to any conclusion, either way. Moreover, Nijboer's reference list is either too thin or non-existent (there is no Bibliography in this book). Nijboer just makes too many mistakes throughout the book for it to be considered a reliable reference. And for this reason I do not recommend this book. Although I don’t recommend this book I do like the general idea of a side by side comparison.

If you’re looking for a comparison between the C.202 and the Spitfire a better book would be Marco Mattioli’s 53o Stormo [1], also from Osprey Publications, it provides day to day operations, is accurate and you get a better sense of the pilots’ abilities and the capabilities of Italian aircraft.

In the End:
The C.202 met the Spitfire Vb/Vc Trop over Malta and elsewhere and although the Spitfire had more guns, the Macchi could out climb, out dive and was as maneuverable while both were approximately the same speed in level flight (Spitfire V), while the Spitfire Vb Trop with the Vokes filter was significantly slower than the C.202. More guns didn’t necessarily mean better, one accurate burst from the twin 0.50 calibre guns of the C.202 was usually enough to shot down an aircraft, an arrangement that the Germans would copy in the Bf.109G series to the end of the war. Regia Aeronautica training, logistics and support were comparable to the other combatants early in the war. In the end it was the industrial might and resources of the West, in particular the US that helped decide the Air War over Malta, as well in Europe and elsewhere – a lesson that should not be forgotten today as more and more strategic manufacturing is shipped abroad.

We'll leave off with a quote from top scoring ace in the Battle of Malta, George Beurling, a Canadian fighter pilot. He was credited with shooting down 27 Axis aircraft in just 14 days over the besieged Mediterranean island. Nine of his kills on Malta were Italian pilots [4]:

"The Jerrie are probably better over-all pilots than the Eyeties, but they certainly let the Italians do their fighting for them when the going got tough. When we get around to adding the final score for this show I hope somebody thinks of that." [5]